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Trial Practice and Procedure
by Philip W. Savrin °
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys the year 2000 decisions of the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals that have a significant impact on issues relating to
trial practice and procedure.
II.
A.

CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS

Title VII and Preemption

In Dickerson v. Alachua County Commission,' the court considered the
first impression issue of whether a Title VII claim preempts a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) claim when the same conduct underlies both causes of action.
The case was brought by an African-American corrections officer who
was demoted after an investigation into an inmate's escape. The
complaint had been filed in state court and alleged a civil rights
conspiracy under Section 1985(3). After the case was removed to federal
court by county-defendants, plaintiff was allowed to amend his complaint
to include a claim of racial discrimination under Title VII and state law,
among other bases for relief.2
The case proceeded to trial by jury, which returned a special verdict
for plaintiff on his Section 1985(3) conspiracy claim. The court denied

* Partner in the firm of Freeman, Mathis & Gary, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Clark
University (B.A., with high honors in Philosophy, 1981); Boston University (J.D., cum
laude, 1985). Law Clerk to the Honorable Harold L. Murphy of the Northern District of
Georgia, 1988-1990. Staff Attorney, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, 1985-1988. Member, American Bar Association, State Bar of Georgia and Defense
Research Institute. Vice President of the Federal Bar Association, Atlanta Chapter. The
author acknowledges the assistance of Kelley Purdie, a third-year law student at Georgia
State University, for her efforts in preparing this Article.
1. 200 F.3d 761 (11th Cir. 2000).
2. Id. at 763-64.
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defense's motion to dismiss the claim as a matter of law. The county
appealed on the basis that plaintiff's Title VII claim preempted a Section
1985(3) conspiracy claim for employment discrimination.'
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit noted that the viability of a Section
1985(3) claim in the face of a Title VII claim was a matter of first
impression for the circuit.4 For guidance in resolving the issue, the
court looked to its previous decision in Johnson v.City of Fort Lauderdale' that considered a challenge to Section 1983 claims arising from
the same facts as claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII. 6
In Johnson defendants argued that Title VII's comprehensive remedial
scheme provided the exclusive remedy for the workplace discrimination
alleged by plaintiff.7 Defendants in Johnson also argued "that if
[Section] 1983 could be used to sue for employment discrimination, Title
VII's procedural safeguards could be undermined."8 After analyzing the
structure and legislative history of Title VII and finding that it reflected
Congress' intent to retain Section 1983 as a parallel remedy for
unconstitutional employment discrimination, the court in Johnson
rejected defendant's arguments, concluding that the Civil Rights Act of
19919 did not render Title VII and Section 1981 the exclusive remedies
for public sector employment discrimination. °
Similarly, the court reasoned in Dickerson that Title VII did not
preempt a constitutional cause of action under Section 1985(3).1
However, this was a pyrrhic victory for plaintiff because the court
vacated the judgment on the separate basis that Section 1985(3) relief
is barred by an intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. 2 In sum, the
doctrine does not allow a county to conspire with itself to deny constitutional rights.1 3 Accordingly, plaintiff was not entitled to the relief
awarded under Section 1985(3)."'

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 765.
Id.
148 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 1998).
200 F.3d at 766.

Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
200 F.3d at 766.
Id.
Id. at 770.
Id.
Id.
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Failureto Plead Companion Claim
In Thigpen v. Bibb County, Georgia Sheriff's Department,5 the
Eleventh Circuit again addressed the interaction between Title VII and
Section 1983, this time answering another question of first impression:
Whether Section 1983 claims are procedurally barred by a failure to
plead companion Title VII claims."
Plaintiffs in Thigpen were white Bibb county police officers who
brought a Section 1983 action against the sheriff's department, asserting
that an employment promotion policy, adopted as part of the settlement
of a prior lawsuit and requiring the department to award fifty percent
of all annual promotions to black officers, violated their rights to equal
protection. Plaintiffs did not raise Title VII claims in their suit. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants and
denied plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on liability. 7
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit found that plaintiffs' lack of property
interest in the relevant promotions did not preclude their equal
protection challenge. 18 Distinguishing between due process claims, in
which a property interest is required, and equal protection claims, in
which it is not, pursuant to Wu v. Thomas, the court held that
plaintiffs alleged proper equal protection claims."0
The court then addressed the relationship between Section 1983 equal
protection claims and Title VII employment discrimination claims. 2'
The court looked first to the Second Circuit, the only circuit to address
the question of whether a Section 1983 claim is viable only if brought
with its companion Title VII claim.22 The court used reasoning from its
own decision in Annis v. County of Westchester" and concluded that,
because Section 1983 claims are not preempted by Title VII, they need
not be brought with Title VII claims.2" Because defendants offered no
authority to support the position that plaintiffs are obligated to bring all
available causes of action, the Eleventh Circuit followed the Second
Circuit, holding that "a [Section] 1983 claim predicated on the violation

15. 223 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2000).
16. Id. at 1234.
17. Id. at 1234, 1236.
18. Id at 1236-37.
19. 847 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir. 1988).
20. 223 F.3d at 1237.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 36 F.3d 251 (2d Cir. 1994).

24. 223 F.3d at 1239.
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of a right guaranteed25 by the Constitution... can be pleaded exclusive
of a Title VII claim.,

The court further held that the burden-shifting analysis used in
employment discrimination cases was not applicable to the officers' equal
protection claims 26 and that the denied promotions underlying the
equal protection claims were not a "continuing violation" for statute of
limitation purposes.27
III.

A.

REMOVAL JURISDICTION

Removal and Evidentiary Limitations

In Sierminski v. Transouth Financial Corp.,2" the Eleventh Circuit
faced another issue of first impression: Whether the district court's
jurisdictional review is limited to the evidence provided at the time the
removal is filed or the record can be thereafter supplemented with
additional information.2" Factually, plaintiff sued in state court under
Florida's Whistle Blower's Act3 ° after being discharged from employment by defendant.3 After defendant removed the case to federal
court, plaintiff unsuccessfully moved to remand to state court.
Thereafter, summary judgment was entered in favor of defendant. On
appeal plaintiff raised the issue of the denial of her motion to remand.32
The basis for plaintiff's remand motion was that the state court
complaint sought less than the jurisdictional amount in controversy for
diversity purposes and that defendant had not shown the amount in
controversy to meet the statutory minimum. 3 Before the district court
ruled on the motion to remand, defendant filed a declaration containing
detailed calculations indicating that damages exceeded the statutory
minimum. Additionally, defendant sent plaintiff a request to admit that
her claim was not worth more than the statutory minimum and argued
the motion to remand should be denied because plaintiff had failed to
respond to the request. The district court denied the motion for remand
based on defendant's calculations and plaintiff's admissions resulting

25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1244.
216 F.3d 945 (11th Cir. 2000).

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 946-47.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.3187 (1992 & Supp. 2001).
216 F.3d at 947.
Id.
Id. At the time of the decision, the amount in controversy was $50,000. It has

since been increased to $75,000.
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from the failure to respond to the request to admit, as provided by Rule
36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.34
In analyzing whether the district court properly relied on evidence
submitted after removal was filed, the Eleventh Circuit noted that it had
no binding precedent. 35 The court instead looked to the flexible
approaches applied by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits that permit such
a procedure.3" The Fifth Circuit, in Allen v. R & H Oil Co.," allowed
the parties in a summary judgment proceeding, to present evidence to
determine the amount in controversy if the amount was not apparent in
the complaint.3 " In Harmon v. OKI Systems, 3' the Seventh Circuit
adopted a similar approach, stating that "the test should simply be
whether the evidence sheds light on the situation which existed when
the case was removed."4 °
After assessing the various considerations, the Eleventh Circuit noted
that it is preferable for a defendant to include all relevant evidence at
the time of removal. 4' However, the court reasoned that "there is no
good reason to keep a district court from eliciting or reviewing evidence
outside the removal petition." Accordingly, the district court's denial
of the remand motion was affirmed.43
B. Removal and Workers' Compensation
The Eleventh Circuit addressed another issue involving removal, this
time in the context of Workers' Compensation, in the case of Reed v. Heil
Co.44 Plaintiff in Reed injured his back while working for defendant
and thereafter performed light duty work for two years until his
termination by the company.4' Following his termination, plaintiff
brought suit in Alabama state court alleging that his termination
violated: (1) the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"); 41 (2) an

34. Id.
35. Id. at 946.
36. Id. at 948-49.
37. 63 F.3d 1326 (5th Cir. 1995).
38. 216 F.3d at 948-49.
39. 115 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 1997).
40. 216 F.3d at 949 (quoting Harmon, 115 F.3d at 479-80).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 949.
43. Id. Moreover, the court held, as a matter of first impression, that Title VII's
retaliation analysis could be applied to causation under Florida's Whistle Blower's Act and
affirmed the district court's summary judgment decision on the merits. Id. at 949-51.
44. 206 F.3d 1055 (11th Cir. 2000).

45. Id. at 1056.
46.

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1999).
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Alabama statute barring retaliation against employees who file Workers'
Compensation claims;47 and (3) constituted a breach of contract.
Defendant removed the action to federal court where summary judgment
was granted on its behalf on all claims.48
In his appeal plaintiff alleged that the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c), which bars the removal of
claims arising under state Workers' Compensation laws. 49 The
Eleventh Circuit recognized that it had not previously resolved whether
a claim of retaliation for filing a Workers' Compensation claim is barred
from removal under Section 1445(c) but noted that two circuits
had
50
addressed this issue and found federal court jurisdiction lacking.
The Eighth Circuit in Humphrey v. Sequentia, Inc.51 and the Fifth
Circuit in Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc. 2 both interpreted the words
"arising under" to have the same meaning under Section 1445(c) as they
do under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the statute controlling federal question
jurisdiction.53 Following the lead of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that plaintiff's retaliatory discharge claim
arose under the state's Workers' Compensation laws for the purposes of
Section 1445(c).64
Consequently, subject matter jurisdiction was
absent, the court concluded, and the retaliatory discharge claim should
have been remanded to state court. 55
IV.

INTERVENTION

Another case of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit, which,
coincidentally, also touched on Workers' Compensation law, was
Crawford & Co. v. Apfel. 56 In Apfel an employer and its insurer sought
to intervene in the employee's social security disability hearing. The
employee had been injured on the job and filed an application for social
security disability benefits and supplemental security income. He also
filed a Workers' Compensation claim under Florida law, seeking an
award of permanent total disability benefits. The social security case

47.

See ALA. CODE § 25-5-11.1 (1999).

48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 1056-57.
Id. at 1058.
Id. at 1059.
58 F.3d 1238 (8th Cir. 1995).

52. 931 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1991).

53.

206 F.3d at 1059. The Eleventh Circuit distinguished two different circuits'

decisions as not applying to the Workers' Compensation context even though they analyzed
whether certain common law causes of action arose under Section 1445(c). Id. at 1059-60.
54. Id. at 1059.
55. Id. at 1060-61.
56. 235 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2000).
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was heard by an Administrative Law Judge, who had refused to allow
the employer and insurer to intervene on the basis that they could be
adversely affected by the administrative decision. The decision refusing
intervention was upheld by the Appeals Council of the Social Security
Administration, based on a finding that the employer and insurer were
not proper parties to the administrative hearing under 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.932(b). 7
The employer and insurer appealed the intervention decision to the
district court. After considerable procedural wrangling, the district court
issued its decision reversing the administrative decision and finding that
the employer and insurer were proper parties to the hearing. 8
The Social Security Commissioner ("Commissioner") appealed the
decision allowing intervention. After determining that it did have
appellate jurisdiction over the intervention issue, the Eleventh Circuit
turned to the merits.59 The court noted that social security disability
hearings are inquisitorial and not adversarial in nature.60 Additionally,
the court indicated that decisions of the Social Security Administration
would not be binding under Florida law.61

After recognizing these

substantive concerns, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court on
a straightforward reading of 20 C.F.R. § 404.932(b), which prohibits
corporate entities from being parties to a social security disability
hearing.12 Thus, notwithstanding the interests of the employer and
insurer, intervention should not have been allowed.
V.

JURISDICTION

A.

Final Judgment
In CSX Transportationv. City of Garden City," the court examined
the rule from Ryan v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.6 4 in assessing its
jurisdiction.6" In CSX Transportation,CSX sued Garden City seeking
indemnification in connection with an accident on its railroad tracks.
CSX and Garden City had previously entered into a contract whereby
Garden City was allowed access to CSX's rights-of-way to construct

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 1299-1301.
Id. at 1301.
Id. at 1303.
Id. at 1304.
Id.
Id.
235 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2000).
577 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1978).
235 F.3d at 1327.
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sewer lines. As part of the agreement, Garden City would maintain
insurance to indemnify CSX for any accidents resulting from Garden
City's use of rights-of-way."
During the course of subsequent construction on the sewer line, a train
operated by Amtrak collided with a construction vehicle, causing injuries
to train passengers. CSX paid damages to the passengers and sued
Garden City for indemnity, pursuant to the parties' agreement. Garden
City, in turn, filed a third-party claim against ARCO, the subcontractor
whose vehicle had been left on the track.67
The district court granted Garden City's summary judgment motion,
but the clerk would not close the case because Garden City's third-party
complaint against ARCO remained pending. Thereafter, and with the
court's approval, Garden City and ARCO voluntarily dismissed ARCO
from the case, without prejudice."8
CSX appealed the grant of summary judgment, and the Eleventh
Circuit began its analysis by addressing jurisdiction. 9 The Eleventh
Circuit, citing Ryan, noted that a partial adjudication on the merits
followed by a voluntary dismissal without prejudice of any pending
claims does not terminate litigation and, therefore, does not satisfy the
requirement of finality set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1291.70 Because no final
order had been entered, jurisdiction would need to be based on an
exception whereby "a series of court orders, considered together, may be
said to constitute a final judgment if they effectively terminate the
litigation."71
Having examined the jurisdictional principles, the Eleventh Circuit
then revisited the holding in Ryan."2 In Ryan the parties tried to make
the case appealable by agreeing to the voluntary dismissal of pending
claims. 73 In contrast, CSX was not guilty of trying to fabricate jurisdiction; in fact, the court found Garden City and ARCO appeared to have
"undertaken to manufacture non-appealability."7 4 Ryan did not apply
because: (1) CSX did not in any way participate in the voluntary
dismissal; (2) CSX did not attempt to manufacture jurisdiction by
collusion with the party dismissing the claim; and (3) jurisdiction was

66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 1326.
Id.
Id. at 1327.
Id. at 1302.

70. Id.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. (citing Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1973)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1328.
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accepted.75 Very significantly, however, the court intimated that if CSX
had been involved in the voluntary dismissal, then jurisdiction might not
have existed.78
B.

Consent to Jurisdiction through Inaction

The case of Rembert v. Apfel" involved another jurisdictional issue
of first impression for the Eleventh Circuit: Whether an appeal can be
taken from a magistrate judge's final order and judgment when the clerk
of the district court invited the parties to consent, through inaction, to
the magistrate judge's final disposition of their case.78 In Rembert a
social security claimant appealed the denial of benefits to the district
court. The appeal was heard before a magistrate judge after the district
court clerk sent the parties a "Notice of Assignment to United States
Magistrate Judge for Trial," which stated that if the parties did not
respond within thirty days requesting reassignment of their case to a
district judge, they were deemed to have consented to the trial and
disposition of their case before the magistrate judge. Neither party
returned the form, and
the magistrate judge entered final judgment
79
against the claimant.
The Eleventh Circuit, acting sua sponte, questioned whether it had
jurisdiction given that consent of the parties to final judgments by
magistrate judges is a jurisdictional necessity.8 0 Because it had not
resolved the issue of consent by inaction previously, the Eleventh Circuit
looked to a Ninth Circuit case, In re Marriage of Nasca,"' which had
invalidated implied consent as adequate to confer jurisdiction on the
court of appeals.82 While the Eleventh Circuit agreed that consent by
inaction is not valid (and consequently dismissed the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction), it did not delineate the parameters of valid consent.8 3 The
court did, however, note that, while consent need not be in writing, it
must be express and on the record. 4

75. Id.
76. Id. at 1329. The Eleventh Circuit also analyzed the merits of the summary
judgment decision and remanded the case for consideration of evidence supplemented in
the record. Id. at 1330-31.
77. 213 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2000).
78. Id. at 1333.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1334.
81. 160 F.3d 578 (9th Cir. 1998).
82. 213 F.3d at 1334.
83. Id. at 1335.
84. Id. See General Trading, Inc. v. Yale Materials Handling Corp., 119 F.3d 1485
(11th Cir. 1997).
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PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT

In Higginbottom v. Carter,85 a pro se prison inmate brought a civil
rights action that alleged excessive use of force against the state
department of corrections and others. The action was dismissed in the
district court due to the inmate's failure to exhaust his state administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act 6
("PLRA"), and the inmate appealed.87
The Eleventh Circuit held, as a matter of first impression, that the
PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to excessive force claims.8 " The
court reasoned that not only did the plain language of the statute
9 but the decision
support this finding, citing Freeman v. Francis,"
is
also supported by the legislative history and purpose of the Act to reduce
frivolous lawsuits.9 ° The court has not yet resolved whether the
exhaustion requirement is ajurisdictional prerequisite to suit or whether
it is more akin to an affirmative defense that must be alleged and
proven by defendant. While some courts have found the requirement to
be a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, others have found it to be an
affirmative defense.9 Whether exhaustion is a jurisdictional
require92
ment in the Eleventh Circuit remains unresolved.
VII.

ABSTENTION AND REMOVAL OF

BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS

Padgett,93

In Christo v.
the court addressed complex issues of
procedure following a case that had been litigated for nearly ten
years.94 The case had its origins in the Christo family's investments in
Bay Bank & Trust ("Bay Bank"), which was owned by a holding
company, Florida Bay Banks ("FBB"). In short, FBB defaulted on a loan
that caused shares of Bay Bank to be auctioned off by court order.
Christo asserted that he had a friend named Kenneth Padgett buy the
stock at auction and that Padgett agreed to turn the stock over to him

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

223 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2000).
18 U.S.C. § 3626 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
223 F.3d at 1260.
Id. at 1260-61.
196 F.3d 641 (6th Cir. 1999).

90. 223 F.3d at 1261.
91. Compare Underwood v. Wilson, 151 F.3d 292 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding exhaustion
is nonjurisdictional) with Langford v. Couch, 50 F. Supp. 2d 544 (E.D. Va. 1999) (holding
exhaustion is jurisdictional).
92. See Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1325-26 (11th Cir. 1998).
93. 223 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2000).
94. Id. at 1328.
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at a later date. Padgett, however, denied the existence of any such
agreement between the parties.95
Christo later filed a Chapter Seven bankruptcy petition, and the
Chapter Seven trustee filed a complaint against Padgett alleging breach
of an oral contract to turn control of Bay Bank over to the Christos.
That suit was settled in an agreement that was contingent on the court's
relating to Bay Bank
finding that the trustee had succeeded to any claim
96
and Padgett's alleged agreement with Christo.
Subsequently, the Christo family filed a complaint in state court
alleging that Padgett had breached his oral contract to purchase Bay
Bank on the Christo family's behalf. Padgett removed the case to federal
court when it was assigned to Judge Collier, who denied Christo's motion
for recusal and deferred ruling on Christo's motion to remand (or to
abstain as mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2)) the case to state court.
On July 13, 1998, the district court held an evidentiary hearing and
found there was no enforceable agreement between Christo and Padgett.
Moreover, the court reasoned that, even if there had been an agreement,
Christo's interest would have passed to his bankruptcy estate. After a
recommendation from the bankruptcy court, the district court approved
the settlement agreement between Padgett and the Trustee. The district
court also denied Christo's motion to remand the suit to state court on
the grounds of issue preclusion based on the July 13 order.97
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit first addressed whether mandatory
abstention under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) applies to cases removed under
28 U.S.C. § 1452. 9' The court decided to follow the majority of circuits
that hold Section 1334(c)(2) applies to state law claims that have been
removed to federal court under Section 1452(a). 99 The Eleventh Circuit
held that it had no jurisdiction to review the district court's decision not
to remand under Section 1334(c)(2) because Christo filed his bankruptcy
petition several months before the effective date of Section 1334(d) (one
of the 1994 amendments to the bankruptcy code), granting appellate
review of decision not to abstain, which was prospective only. 00
In sum, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's (1) denial of
Christo's motion to recuse himself;, 1 (2) approval of the settlement

95. Id. at
96. Id. at
97. Id. at
98. Id. at
99. Id.
100. Id. at
101. Id. at
judge made in
Bay Bank and

1328-29.
1329.
1329-30.
1331.
1331-32.
1333. Christo's motion for recusal was based upon certain comments the
reference to a campaign by the Christo family opposing outside control of
the judge's prior sentencing of one of the Christo children. ld.
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grounds.1 2

and (3)
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dismissal of Christo's claims on preclusion

VIII.

CONCLUSION

This year's review of Eleventh Circuit cases contains a significant
number of issues of first impression. It is hoped this Article will assist
the bench and bar with the ongoing complexities of federal court
practice.

102.

Id. at 1340.

